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Abstract
In India, where energy access is limited, how does the public react to the government’s in-
ability to provide the citizens with basic energy services, such as electricity and clean cooking
fuel? We answer this question using a survey conducted in two rural villages of Uttar Pradesh.
First, we examine the association between a respondent’s opinion on state intervention and
policy failure. Specifically, we focus on whether people who believe in state intervention
are likely to have lower levels of satisfaction with the government’s energy access policies.
Second, we examine the link between policy failure and the likelihood that people consider
a political candidate’s energy views in voting. We find that people’s preference for govern-
ment intervention has a negative effect on satisfaction levels with government policies, and
that people who blame the government for policy failures are less likely to take a political
candidate’s energy policies into account when voting.
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1 Introduction
India’s energy situation is highly problematic; nowhere is the problem as severe as in the large
states of North India such as Uttar Pradesh. About 304 million people do not have any access
to electricity in the country, and 815 million Indians rely on traditional biomass and do not have
access to modern cooking fuel (?). One particularly striking aspect about India’s energy woes is
that they exist, especially in rural areas. As ?: 238 put it, “[d]espite conscious efforts of the central
and provincial governments since the start of the planning process in 1951, past efforts in terms
of both policies and programmes have achieved only marginal success.”1 So how do Indians
interpret such policy failure? Do they blame the government for the poor situation? Answering
these questions is important for scholarship on energy policy. Given the major role of the Indian
government in providing electricity to rural India, it is important to identify the determinants of
public opinion in the field of energy policy. In other words, we want to know how the public
reacts to the Indian government’s efforts to provide the citizens with basic energy services.
We answer the above questions using a survey conducted in two villages in the state of Uttar
Pradesh in February-March 2013. The main aim of the survey was to examine the preferences of
Indian villagers about different energy sources. For the purposes of this paper, we focus on the
respondents’ reaction to policy failure. Specifically, we proxy the respondents’ reaction to policy
breakdown with satisfaction levels about the government’s provision of different types of energy.
The survey was carried out in rural villages where residents typically face severe electricity
shortages, and we use the sample only to test our hypotheses and do not claim representativeness
with the larger population of the country.
First, we stress the respondent’s pre-existing beliefs about the state’s intervention in the free
market to explain the variation in these satisfaction levels. In the Indian context, policy debates
often revolve around the role of the state in promoting development, and there is a sharp ide-
ological cleavage between supporters and opponents of aggressive state policy (??). We claim
that people who prefer the state to provide energy access blame the government for not doing
1These caveats may not apply to the advances made in the use of solar photovoltaic lighting systems, solar energy
programs, and off-grid rural electrification in the country. ??? provide excellent discussions on these programs.
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enough. Unlike their counterparts who favor the free market, they do not blame infrastructure
problems or exogenous market factors in the event of policy failure. They expect the government
to correct market failures and blame it when they have unreliable energy access.
Second, we argue that people who blame the government for failures to provide energy access
are more likely not to take a candidate’s proposals on energy into account when voting. They
treat such information as cheap talk and feel that policy failures by the government are likely
to continue, regardless of the candidate’s promises (?).2 We investigate this issue because, in a
democratic setting, voting is the most important channel through which ordinary citizens can
influence policy and promote the provision of public goods (?). Our goal is to understand what
types of voters are the most likely to express their preference and care about energy policy as a
development issue.
Our empirical results support both hypotheses. A person who prefers state intervention has
5.8 percent lower satisfaction levels with the government’s energy policy, even after controlling
for overall satisfaction with energy access, than someone who does not prefer state interven-
tion. We also find that people who blame the government for policy failures are less likely to
consider a political candidate’s proposals on energy during an election. Specifically, when a per-
son’s dissatisfaction with the government for policy failures moves from the first quartile (25th
percentile) to the third quartile (75th percentile), then the probability that he/she will consider a
candidate’s energy proposals decreases by 8 percentage points (holding his/her satisfaction with
energy access, belief in the market and trust in politics at mean levels).
The small sample size notwithstanding, the study suggests potential policy implications. To
the extent that a government implements failing energy policies, our evidence suggests, people
simply tune out of the issue and ignore any electoral promises and campaigning on the subject.
This negative reaction may in turn reduce political competition on policies and programs for
improved energy access, encouraging politicians to continue making empty promises, such as
the provision of free and reliable electricity for everyone. Indeed, when we did our fieldwork in
2Our fieldwork in the area has suggested that rural voters in the area saw the candidate’s talk as such. Many longer
open-ended interviews suggested that people were frustrated with politicians and dissatisfied with their efforts to
improve energy access.
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the study villages and other areas of rural Uttar Pradesh, several villagers told us that they have
little interest in electoral promises of improved electricity supply because of their apparent non-
credibility. As a result, we may need a change in the nature of mass opinion to improve energy
access for rural households. Our study is focused on the testing of hypotheses related to state
intervention and policy failure, and policy failure and voting. The extension and interpretation of
these findings to the state of Uttar Pradesh or India more generally will require further research.
The problem of poor energy access is not confined to India. Energy infrastructures are largely
inefficient across many developing countries (??). Our study sheds light on the demand side for
policy intervention in a developing country with democratic institutions. This is particularly
important because electoral pressure is a source of potential policy change (?). Of course, India
may be different in other fundamental ways from other developing countries, but we believe that
the importance of people’s expectations from the state are at the heart of policymaking across
borders.
2 Energy Access in India and Uttar Pradesh
Access to reliable and good quality energy sources remains a problem in many developing coun-
tries. This is especially true in India, where one-third of the population remains without access
to electricity (?) and three-fourths of the population use firewood as their main fuel for cooking
(?). The situation is particularly dire in Uttar Pradesh, where less than 24% of the households
have been electrified (?). For the year 2014-15, the Central Electricity Authority identified a
gap of nearly 15% between electricity capacity and projected demand in the state (?). In rural
Uttar Pradesh, firewood and dung account for almost 90% of the cooking fuels, and Liquified
Petroleum Gas (LPG) for cooking has not yet made inroads in Uttar Pradesh villages (?).
There are some government programs in India that have attempted to improve electricity
access in rural parts of the country, most prominently the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran
Yojana (RGGVY), which aims to build rural electricity infrastructure across the country. However,
earlier policies have failed to provide adequate and reliable electricity to rural households (??),
and even the more recent RGGVY, which only focuses on grid extension, does not address the
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reliability of electricity supply or constitute the complete electrification of villages.3
There are a number of reasons why many of the earlier government policies have not de-
livered on their promises. As several authors point out, many of the policies were not focused
on rural expansion,4 did not possess an institutional facet, were not effective with their delivery,
faced infrastructure problems, or had inadequate distribution mechanisms (????). In the case of
Uttar Pradesh, the State Electricity Board has historically faced problems related to the high costs
in buying electricity from neighboring states, large subsidies to the agricultural sector in the re-
gion (?), and poor maintenance of the infrastructure (?). Politicians routinely make tall promises
about the provision of electricity (especially during election periods), and there is considerable
patronage politics surrounding the power sector in Uttar Pradesh and India at large (???).
While programs like RGGVY have focused on electricity, the National Biomass Cookstoves
Initiative and the National Rural LPG Distribution Scheme have revolved around providing re-
liable access to cooking fuel (?: 245-246). These initiatives were introduced in 2009 and plan to
distribute improved cookstoves to more than two million households by 2017 (?). The achieve-
ment these goals faces some hurdles, however, since past programs have lacked focus and effec-
tiveness (?). Also, subsidies provided for LPG and kerosene use have mainly benefited higher
income households that live in urban areas (??). An earlier initiative in 1993 that allowed private
companies to supply LPG to rural households in the country was not profitable because of state
subsidies (?). In addition, like with electricity, access to clean cooking energy has also suffered
from infrastructure problems and weak distribution mechanisms.
To summarize, energy access in rural India, with respect to both electricity and cooking, is
poor and these policy failures have been traced back to challenges faced by the government.
These policy failures may be due to inadequate or limited importance provided to the energy
access issues in rural areas by the different governments, both federal and provincial. While the
focus on the reasons for policy failure is useful, an important aspect missed by studies on energy
access in India is the impact these policy failures have had on the rural population, especially
3For data on the RGGVY’s achievements, see state-wise reports on the official website at http://rggvy.gov.in/
rggvy/rggvyportal/statewisesummary.jsp (accessed April 28, 2015).
4RGGVY, which does focus on rural electrification, is an important exception.
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their attitudes regarding the government and their vote choice.
3 Theory
What shapes the opinion of Indian villagers about the government’s energy policy? Given the
Indian government’s stated responsibility to provide reliable energy to the public in the world’s
largest democracy (?), it is important to examine the determinants of public opinion in the do-
main of energy policy. Specifically, we aim to understand the reactions of the public in the event
of a policy failure, and who blames the Indian government when it does not provide satisfactory
access to energy sources.
3.1 Foundations
The arguments we advance are based on political economy theories of energy poverty. From
the political perspective, energy access can be thought of as an accountability issue. Theories
of regulatory capture suggest that issue areas such as energy policy are frequently captured by
special interests (????). While energy planners and regulators are supposed to serve the interests
of the people, in practice vested interests often exert a significant influence on their decisions.
According to these theories, policy formulation often fails to reflect the interests of marginalized
and politically weak groups. Indeed, according to ?, governance is a key obstacle to eradicating
energy poverty, and ? lists regulatory governance as a key research question for social scientists
in the field of energy.
Our analysis engages this line of research by focusing on public reactions. Ultimately, reg-
ulatory capture and other related governance failures reflect the lack of political accountability
(?????). If people believe that they are unable to influence politicians through voting and public
protest, then the accountability mechanism is broken. Therefore, the legitimacy of political insti-
tutions is an essential component of accountability for avoiding regulatory capture. In the case
of energy poverty, we can test hypotheses about the relationship between people’s fundamental
beliefs and their views of government performance, along with the role of energy access in voting
behavior.
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3.2 Hypotheses
India has a long history of state intervention (?), and basic energy services are no exception
(??). To explain variation in people’s satisfaction of the Indian government’s energy policy, we
emphasize pre-existing beliefs about the relationship between the state and markets. If people
have a preference for free markets compared to strong state intervention, they are less likely to
blame a government for weak policies to promote energy access. Instead, they could attribute
the problem to the high price of energy and the difficulty of delivering it to their village. They
might not expect high levels of efficiency from government policy and we expect such people not
to attribute India’s energy access problems to the government. If many rural communities and
social groups do not have access to basic energy services, this reflects fundamental market forces
such as the cost of energy, the difficulty of supplying such energy to remote localities, and rural
customers’ weak ability to pay.
However, if people support state intervention, they expect their government to implement
effective policies that guarantee energy access to rural dwellers and an effective delivery mech-
anism at an affordable price, and they blame the government when they do not gain access to
sufficient energy for their basic needs. When such people live in rural India, they do not tend
to blame cost of energy or the difficulty of supplying it to remote areas. For them, the Indian
government may favor urban over rural localities, or prefer providing energy to other rural areas
in the country based on political considerations (?).
Hypothesis 1 (state intervention and policy failure). In rural India, people who believe in the merits
of state intervention are more likely to blame the government for policy failure than their counterparts who
support free markets.
We next investigate the effect of dissatisfaction with government energy policy on voting
behavior. We argue that dissatisfaction with government energy policy reduces people’s interest
in energy access as an electoral issue, further deteriorating the status quo. Specifically, we expect
people who blame the government for policy failures to influence their voting preferences. In
general, people who both blame and do not blame the government for policy failures are actively
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involved in the voting process. In fact, more than 95% of the respondents in our sample reported
voting in the last state’s election in 2012.5 This high number partly reflects the fact that we
only interviewed household heads, but it may also reflect some social desirability bias in the
responses: some people may be reporting voting even if they actually did not. In any case, for
the purposes of hypothesis testing for social science, a sample that has many people voting is
useful. At the same time, only 63% of the respondents in our sample take a candidate’s proposals
on energy into account.
Our theoretical prediction is built on the following argument. When people blame the govern-
ment for policy failures and have little trust in the ability of the elites to improve energy access,
they do not expect the policies of the government to change depending on the specific party in
power. This kind of deep distrust does not depend on the identity of the party, as the people
believe that politicians and government officials are not trustworthy. Hence, they do not see the
need to pay attention to a candidate’s energy proposal during an election. Such proposals may
be seen as part of the campaign process and such people do not expect the government to deliver
on its electoral promises. Hence in an environment characterized by persistent policy failure,
citizens have little reason to consider a candidate’s energy policy preferences. Since they believe
the government to be ineffective and incapable of solving energy access problems, a political
candidate’s policy views are but cheap talk.
Hypothesis 2 (policy failure and voting). In rural India, people who blame the government for policy
failures are less likely to consider a political candidate’s energy views in voting.
This line of argument is rooted in the literature on issue specific voting (?), which contrasts
with the Columbia and Michigan schools that emphasize groups and party identification respec-
tively (??). The issue at hand is a political candidate’s proposed policy on energy if he or she
comes into power. However, we show that there is significant variation in people who pay atten-
tion to a candidate’s proposals, and argue that those who are dissatisfied with the government
tend to place lower emphasis on such future policy claims.
5Overall, voter turnout in Shahjahanpur district in the 2012 State Assembly electitons was 66%, well in excess of
the state average of 60% (?: 80-81). The discrepancy results partly from our focus on household heads and possibly
partly from over-reporting of voting by the respondents.
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4 Research Design
We test the above hypotheses with a survey conducted in the Indian villages of Toni and Chitte in
Shahjahanpur district in the state of Uttar Pradesh in India. By our count, the number households
in the survey area was approximately 700 during the time of the survey. This setting is useful
since Uttar Pradesh is the most populous state in the country with a population of nearly 200
million (?), and it is politically the most important state in the country (?). In addition, this
is a fitting venue to study the energy preferences of rural Indian residents since Uttar Pradesh
faces acute electricity shortages with many areas still unconnected to the national electricity grid.
However, we do not claim representativeness to the larger Indian population. Instead, we use
this survey to test hypotheses on state intervention and policy failure, and on policy failure and
voting behavior.
We selected the two villages both for substantive and practical reasons. Substantively, we re-
quested that our survey team identify villages that have approximately the same level of energy
access as other areas of rural India. These two villages had a 70% electrification rate, most vil-
lagers relied on firewood but LPG was in principle available, and most households spent at least
some money on kerosene on a monthly basis. We also made sure that the two chosen villages
were nearby to avoid any issues with splitting the enumerator team into two. This allowed one
of us to be present for many of the interviews during the beginning of the project, enhancing our
ability to verify data quality and proper conduct of the survey. While we did not participate in
all of the surveys, we spent enough time in the field to verify that the enumerators were properly
trained and capable of conducting the survey research according to our instructions.
To be sure, we have to emphasize that these two villages do not allow us to offer representative
descriptions of rural Uttar Pradesh. In this state, rural electrification rates are generally much
lower. According to the 2011 Census of India (?), for example, only 24% of rural households
were electrified. While the situation continues to improve, if perhaps slowly, thanks to RGGVY,
we recognize that our study villages have higher electrification rates than most villages in the
states. Therefore, future studies along our lines should study both more and less electrified areas
to offer a more comprehensive description of the realities of energy access in Uttar Pradesh and
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rural areas of other states.
The survey involved asking respondents about their preferences about different energy sources,
their satisfaction levels with the government in providing them, and collecting demographic in-
formation about the individual and household. We focus on the energy preferences of the re-
spondents and examine the role of the state, policy failure and voting behavior in the realm of
energy provision. The survey was conducted by MORSEL, a company that specializes in social
science survey research in India, and especially in rural Uttar Pradesh. This company has ex-
tensive experience with social science research, including several successful large rural energy
surveys. Our enumerators had previous experience with rural energy surveys and we verified in
the training that they were capable of posing the questions properly. This survey was conducted
in February-March 2013, and included a total of 401 respondents across the two villages. The
respondents were randomly chosen from a list of all of the households constructed by the survey
team. Each household was chosen with the same probability and we deliberately avoided pur-
posive sampling because we wanted to interview a typical cross-section of the village population
without conditioning on household characteristics.
There is considerable variation in age, education, caste, and religion among the respondents
The mean age of the respondents was around 41 years, had nearly 5 years of schooling on average,
and around 85 percent of the respondents were married. In addition, the 401 respondents were
distributed among 53 castes and 4 major religions. About 70% of the households were already
electrified at the time of the survey, and the average monthly household income was in the range
of 2, 000-3, 000 rupees. The majority of the respondents were satisfied to some extent on the
availability of LPG, kerosene, firewood and dung, but were very dissatisfied with the availability
of biogas and charcoal. There is not much variation in the gender of the respondents and only
around 7% of the respondents were women. This is because it is hard to interview female
respondents without the presence of a male household member in India, who may influence the
respondent’s choices to questions on the survey.
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The estimation equations for Hypothesis 1 on state intervention and policy failure is:
Y1ij = β0 + β1 · Government Interventionij + β2 · Xij + αj + eij, (1)
where Y1ij is a measure of respondent i’s satisfaction level with the government in providing
energy access and who resides in village j, Government Interventionij is a binary indicator vari-
able about respondent i’s preference for government intervention in the free market, and Xij is
a vector of control variables including education levels, trust in politics, monthly income, and
satisfaction with access to different types of energy sources. These variables are discussed in
greater depth in the following section. Lastly, αj denotes village fixed effects and eij is the error
term. To verify that the linearity assumptions does not cause bias, we also replicated the analysis
with an ordered logistic regression. The results remain unchanged.
The estimation equation for Hypothesis 2 on policy failure and voting is:
Prob(Y2ij) = γ0 + γ1 · Dissatisfaction Levelij + γ2 · Zij + ψj + δij, (2)
where Y2ij is an indicator of whether respondent i from village j takes into account a candidate’s
proposals on household energy into account when voting. Dissatisfaction Levelij is a measure of
the respondent i’s level of dissatisfaction with the government in providing energy access who
lives in village j, and Zij is a vector of control variables including energy access satisfaction, belief
in the free market and trust in politics. Lastly, ψj are village fixed effects and δij is the error term.
We estimate the first with standard ordinary least squares (OLS), while the second equation is
estimated with a probit model using robust standard errors in all regressions.6
4.1 Dependent Variables
The dependent variable for Hypothesis 1 is a measure of the level of government satisfaction in
providing different sources of energy to households. The specific fuel sources are LPG, kerosene,
biogas, charcoal, firewood, and dung. The level of satisfaction of government efforts to provide
each energy source is measured on a scale of 0-4 from ‘Very Unsatisfied’ to ‘Very Satisfied.’ The
6The results also hold with the use of a logistic regression instead.
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use of a 0-4 scale is useful since there is considerable variation in the levels of satisfaction with
the government in its provision of the different energy sources.
To account for lighting needs, we also include a related question on lighting satisfaction, mea-
sured on the same 0-4 scale from a separate module of the questionnaire. Because the question is
from a different module, we must offer two caveats: the question wording is slightly different and
the question does not focus specifically on electricity. Reassuringly, however, the results are ro-
bust if we remove the lighting question or limit the analysis to electrified households only. These
robustness tests show that the inclusion or exclusion of lighting satisfaction do not significantly
modify the final empirical results of the study.
These energy forms cover the most common choices of rural Indian households for cooking
and lighting. Firewood is the most common fuel source with 70% of rural households using it
for cooking, with biomass, dung, and LPG accounting for the rest. Kerosene is also the most
common fuel source for lighting with 83% of the households using it in the rural areas (?). In
our sample villages, dung was the most common cooking fuel (77%) followed by firewood (48%),
and about 97% of our respondents used some kerosene for lighting. While our survey did not
have a specific question about satisfaction with electricity access, about 70% of the sample was
electrified, meaning that these people would consider electricity their primary lighting source.
Figure 1 below provides a distribution of these satisfaction levels by the different energy
sources. Rural Indian households are most satisfied with kerosene and the least satisfied with
biogas and charcoal. The majority are also satisfied with the provision of LPG and dung but are
not that satisfied with the government efforts concerning access to firewood. Notably, lighting
satisfaction is also generally quite high, perhaps reflecting the 70% electrification rate in the
villages.
[Figure 1 about here.]
We construct the dependent variable in two ways: (1) as the sum of each of these seven
variables, and (2) by constructing a satisfaction index of the different energy sources using factor
analysis. As each of these two ways comes with a tradeoff, we use both to corroborate our
results; in fact, we can show that our findings are qualitatively identical, independent of the
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exact construction of the dependent variable. Using the sum of each of the seven different energy
sources has two main advantages: First, it allows for a simple measure of the satisfaction level
of the respondent. Second, it takes the level of satisfaction on all seven sources of energy into
account. However, it places equal weight on each of the seven components on the overall level
of satisfaction. Factor analysis allows us to overcome this limitation by creating a single variable
that captures the respondent’s latent satisfaction level, with the weights that are placed on the
different components being determined by the data. Yet, using this approach limits us from
making clear substantial claims on satisfaction levels.
The dependent variable for Hypothesis 2 is a binary indicator variable of whether the respon-
dent takes a political candidate’s proposal on household energy into account when exercising his
right to vote. About 63% of the respondents in the survey state that they consider such proposals.
4.2 Explanatory and Control Variables
The main explanatory variable is a measure of whether the respondent thinks that the gov-
ernment should intervene in the free market. The actual question asked in the survey is “The
government can intervene in the economy by, for example, controlling the price of food and fuel.
Do you think that the government should intervene in the economy or should the market be
completely free?” The enumerators were also instructed to explain the notion of free markets
upon request to the respondents as a situation in which private producers sell goods and ser-
vices to consumers without the government regulating the price. Respondents who opted for the
choice that the government should intervene in the economy were coded as 1 for the explanatory
variable. This indicator variable is intended as a measure of the extent to which the respondent
believes that government intervention is necessary.
There are a number of control variables that we also use in the analysis. Since education
levels could make a respondent more aware of the impact of government policies and hence
affect their trust levels in government, we control for the number of school years. Similarly,
wealthier households have greater access to energy and could also be more satisfied with the
government in general, so we control for household’s monthly income group (11 groups, with
lowest being 0-999 and highest being above 10,000 rupees).
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In addition, we control for the respondent’s trust in politics, as it could affect their levels of
satisfaction of government policy for energy access. Specifically, we sum over answers to five
questions about trust in politics (general, Prime Minister, Chief Minister, government officials,
panchayat officials), each on a 0-4 scale with higher values indicating more trust. We also include
a binary indicator for the respondent’s belonging to the officially designated government castes
to account for the prior political dispositions of certain castes.
We control for the objective energy access situation in two different ways. First, we include the
summed value of energy access satisfaction – as opposed to satisfaction with government policy
– for the fuels listed above, again on a 0-4 scale with higher values indicating more satisfaction.
Second, to specifically consider electrification of the household as a key predictor of lighting
quality, we include a binary indicator for household electrification.
Table 2 contains the summary statistics for the full list of variables used. Overall, rural
households in the surveyed area are not satisfied with government provision of access to different
energy sources with the mean satisfaction levels around eleven on a scale from 0 to 28. The
majority of the respondents took a candidate’s proposal on energy into account when voting but
only around 35% preferred government intervention in the free market. In addition, the majority
of the household heads were married and lived in an electrified household. However, average
levels of education are low with average number of school years at 4.6 out of a maximum of 22.
[Table 1 about here.]
5 Findings
We summarize the findings concerning the two hypotheses separately.
5.1 State Intervention and Policy Failure
When the dependent variable is computed as the sum of satisfaction levels of individual energy
sources, we find negative effects for the respondent’s attitude towards government intervention.
Table 3 provides the results of five different models with successively more control variables.
Model (1) only includes our main explanatory free market indicator and the education level vari-
able. Model (2) adds the trust in politics variable, Model (3) includes an electrification dummy
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and monthly household income. Models (4) and (5) extend the set of controls to include dummy
variables for government caste, martial status as well as satisfaction levels with energy access.
All models control for village fixed effects. With all the control variables, a respondent’s positive
attitude toward government intervention is, on average, associated with a decrease of 1.5 units in
the satisfaction scale relative to a respondent with a negative perception.7 This is 38% of the stan-
dard deviation (4.01), indicating a relatively large change; relative to the maximum, the change
is 5.8%.
[Table 2 about here.]
The same holds when we compute the dependent variable as an index using factor analysis.
Table 4 provides the results. The models are similar, except we replace the sum with the principal
factor in the dependent variable. The negative effect of the respondent’s attitude towards govern-
ment intervention holds across all models. A respondent’s positive attitude toward government
intervention is, on average, associated with a decrease of 0.36 units relative to a respondent with a
negative attitude. On the index latent scale, this is equivalent to a 8.8% percentage point decrease
in satisfaction levels relative to the maximum.
[Table 3 about here.]
Thus far, we have examined the effect of the respondent’s attitude towards government inter-
vention on government satisfaction levels towards all energy sources. This opens the question of
whether there are any effects on the satisfaction levels on any of the individual energy sources.
Table 1 provides correlations between the respondent’s attitude towards government interven-
tion and each individual energy source. We find that the negative effects hold for LPG, charcoal,
firewood and dung, but not for kerosene and biogas. They also do not hold for lighting. Since
there is very little access to LPG in rural India in general (only about 15% of respondents in our
sample use LPG), the negative effect reflects its poor availability and relatively high cost. Fire-
wood and dung are used extensively in the villages of Uttar Pradesh (69% of respondents in our
7The results are similar if we conduct the regressions separately for the two villages. In both cases, the coefficient
for support for government intervention is negative and statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.
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sample use firewood and 88% use dung), and the negative effect reflects a dissatisfaction with
government policy about access to these two fuels. Charcoal and biogas are not used widely
(less than 3% in our sample use charcoal and nobody uses biogas) and the negative effect could
just reflect unavailability of the fuel. On the other hand, kerosene is widely used (nearly 97% of
the respondents in our sample use kerosene), and the non-effect could indicate that government
efforts to provide kerosene subsidies may have helped a little – though such subsidies help the
wealthier urban population more than they do rural Indian villagers (?). The non-finding on
lighting may reflect the relatively high electrification rate of 70% in the local context.
5.2 Policy Failure and Voting Behavior
We now examine whether dissatisfaction levels of the government’s provision of energy access
has an effect on voting behavior. For ease of interpretation, we invert our original variable –
satisfaction with government energy policy – so that higher values indicate more dissatisfaction.
Table 5 provides results on the association between the respondent’s dissatisfaction levels and
likelihood that he takes a political candidate’s energy policies into account when voting. We
estimate probit regressions with village fixed effects.
[Table 4 about here.]
From the results, we can see that higher levels of dissatisfaction with the government’s poli-
cies of providing energy access is negatively associated with the likelihood that a respondent
pays attention to a candidate’s energy proposals during an election. While this effect is sta-
tistically significant at the 0.01 level in the first two models, it dips to the 0.1 level once the
respondent’s belief in the market and level of trust in politics are included in the specifications.
In turn, Figure 2 presents the marginal effects of dissatisfaction with government policies on the
probability that a respondent takes a political candidate’s positions on energy into account when
casting his vote. These estimations are based on the most comprehensive model. Substantively,
this means that when a person’s dissatisfaction with the government for policy failures moves
from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, then the probability that he/she will consider a
candidate’s energy proposals decreases by 8 percentage points (holding his/her satisfaction with
16
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
G
ov
t
In
te
rv
en
ti
on
in
Fr
ee
M
ar
ke
t
(I
nd
ic
at
or
)
-0
.6
97
∗∗
∗
0.
12
8
-0
.0
90
-0
.1
99
∗∗
-0
.6
60
∗∗
∗
-0
.5
20
∗∗
∗
0.
20
9
(0
.1
50
)
(0
.1
20
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
83
)
(0
.1
39
)
(0
.1
55
)
(0
.1
33
)
C
on
st
an
t
2.
55
6∗
∗∗
2.
54
1∗
∗∗
0.
26
6∗
∗∗
0.
41
7∗
∗∗
1.
73
7∗
∗∗
2.
26
6∗
∗∗
1.
79
8∗
∗∗
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
88
)
(0
.0
86
)
(0
.0
84
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
40
1
40
1
40
1
40
1
40
1
40
1
39
7
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
∗
p
<
0.
10
,∗
∗
p
<
0.
05
,∗
∗∗
p
<
0.
01
Ta
bl
e
1:
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
is
th
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
’s
le
ve
lo
fs
at
is
fa
ct
io
n
in
th
e
go
ve
rn
m
en
tt
o
pr
ov
id
e
LP
G
,k
er
os
en
e,
go
ba
r
ga
s,
ch
ar
co
al
,fi
re
w
oo
d,
du
ng
,a
nd
lig
ht
in
g.
A
ll
th
e
ab
ov
e
m
od
el
s
ar
e
lin
ea
r
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
17
energy access, belief in the market and trust in politics at mean levels).
[Figure 2 about here.]
The result supports the hypothesis that respondents who are dissatisfied with government
policies on energy treat a candidate’s campaign promises as cheap talk. They do not believe that
voting for a politician who claims to bring better energy access to their village will actually im-
prove their living conditions. In addition to a respondent’s dissatisfaction with the government,
the respondent’s belief in the market and trust in politics variables are also positively associated
with the respondent’s likelihood of paying attention to a candidate’s energy proposals. This
makes sense since economic ideology and trust are known factors in the literature on voting
behavior (??).
6 Conclusion
India’s energy poverty remains high, as two-thirds of the population continues to rely on tradi-
tional biomass for cooking and one-third has no access to basic household electricity. There is a
clear need for an aggressive and robust policy response. However, India’s central and state gov-
ernments face formidable challenges in implementing policies that would significantly reduce
energy poverty. We have sought to understand the nature of this policy failure by examining the
relationship between people’s beliefs about the role of the government in the economy and their
views of energy policy. Using survey data from two villages in rural Uttar Pradesh, we have
found that people who believe the government should play an important role in energy policy
are not satisfied with the government’s current efforts. Moreover, these people seem to ignore
the energy policy positions of candidates for office in elections. To the extent that these findings
generalize beyond our sample, it could be that the government’s failing energy policy is reducing
public interest in this policy issue.
These findings are significant: If people dissatisfied with the government’s performance re-
acted by demanding better policies, then politicians would have incentives to supply such policies
and improve the situation. However, our evidence suggests that people who believe in govern-
ment intervention respond to the government’s policy failure by simply ignoring the issue. This
18
is a counterproductive response that could induce politicians to focus their efforts on other is-
sues. As a result, there is reason for pessimism about energy poverty at least among our survey
respondents. Further research is required to ascertain whether these findings hold in the state of
Uttar Pradesh or India more generally.
Energy poverty is not unique to India. Other countries in South Asia (e.g. Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh), Southeast Asia (e.g. Philippines and Indonesia), and Sub-Saharan Africa (with the
exception of South Africa) face similar issues in alleviating rural electrification and providing ac-
cess to clean cooking fuel to its rural population. Some of these countries have implemented rural
electrification programs and LPG distribution schemes, but they too face transmission and distri-
bution issues that reduce the efficacy of such programs. Our results suggest that, like among our
survey respondents, without public pressure electoral competition alone may not provide politi-
cians with incentives to implement decisive measures to combat energy poverty in rural areas.
Whether the findings of our paper hold in these other settings would require further in-depth
research in these contexts. ? has posed some important questions for the social science research
agenda in energy scholarship, and our approach of testing hypotheses using quantitative studies
in small settings could possibly contribute towards understanding good practices in regulatory
governance.
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Figure 1: Satisfaction levels by energy source. The figure shows the percentage of respondents
falling under different categories on a 0-4 scale.
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The above figure plots the predicted probability (along with 95% confidence intervals) of whether
the respondent takes a candidate’s proposals into account when voting. Government dissatisfaction
levels are coded on a 0−28 scale. See the text for details.
Predicted Probability for Energy Voting
Figure 2: Marginal effects of dissatisfaction with government on energy voting. The estimates
are based on the probit regressions from the last model in Table 5.
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mean sd min max count
Govt Energy Policy Satisfaction (Sum) 10.96 4.01 0.0 26.0 397
Govt Energy Policy Satisfaction (Factor) 0.00 0.83 -1.2 2.8 397
Candidate Proposal 0.63 0.48 0.0 1.0 401
Government Intervention 0.35 0.48 0.0 1.0 401
Trust in Politics 11.94 6.01 0.0 20.0 401
Energy Access Satisfaction 10.33 3.42 1.0 22.0 401
Schooling (Years) 4.61 4.57 0.0 22.0 401
Electricity (Indicator) 0.70 0.46 0.0 1.0 401
Monthly Income 3.42 1.74 1.0 11.0 401
Government Caste (Indicator) 0.27 0.45 0.0 1.0 401
Married (Indicator) 0.84 0.36 0.0 1.0 401
Observations 401
Table 2: Summary statistics for dependent, explanatory, and control variables. The minima and
maxima are based on the actual highest and lowest values in the data. In the case of energy policy
(access) satisfaction, the theoretical maximum is 28 (24). For all other variables, the maxima and
minima correspond to the theoretical extreme.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Govt Intervention in Free Market (Indicator) -1.782∗∗∗ -1.728∗∗∗ -1.684∗∗∗ -1.687∗∗∗ -1.508∗∗∗
(0.415) (0.413) (0.412) (0.416) (0.399)
Schooling (Years) 0.079∗ 0.082∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.063
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.042)
Trust in Politics 0.075∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.044
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029)
Electricity (Indicator) -0.669 -0.691 -0.767∗
(0.432) (0.456) (0.410)
Monthly Income -0.143 -0.141 -0.093
(0.112) (0.114) (0.112)
Government Caste (Indicator) -0.107 -0.310
(0.453) (0.414)
Married (Indicator) -0.125 -0.458
(0.478) (0.433)
Energy Access Satisfaction 0.446∗∗∗
(0.063)
Observations 397 397 397 397 397
r2 0.070 0.082 0.093 0.093 0.227
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Government energy policy satisfaction. The dependent variable in all models is the sum
of the respondent’s level of satisfaction in the government to provide LPG, kerosene, biogas,
charcoal, firewood, dung, and lighting. All the above models are linear regressions that include
village level fixed effects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Govt Intervention in Free Market (Indicator) -0.378∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086)
Schooling (Years) 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.012 0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Trust in Politics -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Electricity (Indicator) -0.221∗∗ -0.235∗∗ -0.239∗∗
(0.090) (0.097) (0.096)
Monthly Income -0.006 -0.009 -0.007
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Government Caste (Indicator) -0.040 -0.049
(0.100) (0.099)
Married (Indicator) 0.101 0.086
(0.104) (0.105)
Energy Access Satisfaction 0.021
(0.013)
Observations 397 397 397 397 397
r2 0.052 0.053 0.067 0.070 0.076
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Government energy policy satisfaction. The dependent variable in all models is the
result of a factor analysis of the respondent’s level of satisfaction in the government to provide
LPG, kerosene, biogas, charcoal, firewood, dung, and lighting. All the above models are linear
regressions that include village level fixed effects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Govt Energy Policy Dissatisfaction -0.057∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.036∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Energy Access Satisfaction 0.013 0.014 0.007
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Do you think that the market should be completely free? 0.538∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.138)
Trust in Politics 0.029∗∗
(0.012)
Observations 397 397 397 397
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5: The dependent variable whether the respondent took a candidate’s energy proposals
into account before voting. All the above models are probit regressions that include village level
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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